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Abstract  
Three main types of dialogue are identified and 
critically discussed: managerial, emancipatory and 
pedagogic. The possibilities and potentials of each kind 
are analysed, and inherent problems are seen to arise 
in practice. Modern universities are assessed in terms 
of their ability to host and embody these different 
types, principally via the work of Bourdieu and 
Passeron. Discussion then turns on the kind of 
communication that would be needed in modern 
universities to overcome important social and 
organisational constraints. Finally, alternative 
conceptions are outlined, principally via the potential 
of electronic communication as a form of dialogue. 
Key words: Bourdieu and Passeron, class closure, 
cultural capital, dialogue, Freire, Habermas, ideal speech 
act, web-based teaching and learning. 
 
Introduction 
There seem to be three possibilities currently on offer in 
educational thought and policy: dialogue as a form of 
human relations, associated with the style of 
management that motivates workers; dialogue as a form 
of a radical emancipation, associated with the work of 
Habermas (McCarthy 1984 has the best introduction) or 
Freire (1972 and see Freire in Dale et al. (1976) ; 
dialogue as a form of practical pedagogy associated with 
learner- centred activity and other forms of 
“progressive” practice. 
Managerial dialogue 
The managerial revolution in education has been much 
discussed, quite often critically.  A number of managerial 
regimes have been tried over the years, as Westoby 
(1988) indicates.  After an initial experiment with line 
management or matrix models, sometimes governed by 
a weak form of scientific management, new approaches 
appeared, based on the human relations tradition.  
Partly this was a response to criticisms about the decline 
of autonomy and collegiality, and partly a response to 
the emerging problem of maintaining externally-
validated quality.  In the human relations tradition, it is 
important to talk to employees in relatively informal 
ways, not just through the official hierarchy.  This is 
supposed to motivate them, bind them to the mission of 
the company, and make them responsible for 
supervising their own work.  It is often thought to be 
particularly suitable for “loosely coupled” organisations 
(Weick in Westoby 1988) where tight forms of work 
discipline and supervision are limited, and where 
employees enjoy a necessarily high level of local 
autonomy, and educational institutions are the classic 
case.  Characteristic forms of such dialogue are found in 
periodic committee meetings or consultation exercises, 
some of them electronic.  These forms are associated 
with managerial significance given to mission or vision 
statements, which rhetorically represent the shared 
values arising from democratic discussion. 
Of course, this is a strategically limited form of dialogue 
and discussion, following a management agenda: it is 
designed to foster committed work and self-supervision, 
while humanising the workplace.  As a result, some 
analysts believe that dialogue for management purposes 
will never become properly rooted in the actual social 
relations of work, which will remain divided along 
occupational lines. Some of the more spectacular 
examples, with informal discussion maintaining “quality 
circles”, originated in Japan, and transferring these 
practices to a different social and cultural context in 
Britain, as a kind of “technical fix”, seem especially 
unlikely to succeed (Ouchi and Wilkins in Westoby 




1988). There is also academic tradition, which insists on 
the right to disagree without organisational penalty 
(enshrined in the 1988 Education Reform Act), and to 
pursue micropolitical resistance to organizational 
initiatives in the name of external allegiances (to 
academic subjects, for example, as well as to specific 
institutions). The divisive tendencies might be expected 
to increase following the development of a management 
stratum in modern universities, as managerial salaries, 
power and conditions draw away from those on 
academic and support pay scales (Harris in Cope et al. 
2006). It is worth noting here that critique is not a 
matter of blaming individual managers. Many actual 
managers are also academics and have to reconcile 
managerial and academic discourses (see Deem 2003). 
Emancipatory dialogue 
In complete contrast, there are versions of dialogue 
intended to radically empower subordinates.  It is 
important to establish that these are radical 
alternatives, since it is not unknown for managerial 
discourses to attempt to invoke the names of people 
such as Habermas and Freire as if they were supporters 
of the far more limited kinds of dialogue described 
above.  In practice, both authors have an interest in 
radical social change, not just the amelioration of social 
conditions in companies. 
Habermas (1984), for example, sets out to define an 
“ideal speech act” which represents the most open and 
participatory kind of dialogue conceivable.  In such an 
ideal act, all participants are entitled to challenge the 
claims to legitimacy of any utterance, regardless of the 
power or status of the participant.  The main claims to 
legitimacy, Habermas suggests, relate to three main 
dimensions (subjective, social and objective), and turn 
on claims to sincerity, social appropriateness, and truth 
respectively.  Habermas insists that these three 
dimensions lie behind properly rounded argumentation, 
and also that the ideal speech act offers a way of 
adequately “grounding” an interest in emancipation.  
Such “grounding” was necessary to insist that an 
emancipatory impulse was not just an idea in the heads 
of philosophers but had some material basis in social 
life.  Habermas had long before rejected the idea that an 
emancipatory political movement would emerge from 
working class experiences after polarisation and class 
struggle, as in the classic 1848 model of Marx and 
Engels. Nor did he see much hope in the “rebellious 
subjectivity” expressed in alternative lifestyles (see 
Bernstein 1985). Discovering an emancipatory potential 
in ordinary speech solved the problem. 
Educational theorists are familiar with earlier attempts 
to provide a genuine basis for emancipation in the work 
of Carr and Kemmis (1986), who used Habermas’s 
concepts of “quasi-transcendental human interests”, 
which included an interest in emancipation, to inform 
their notion of a fully rounded curriculum.  As Habermas 
noted himself, though, there is an ambiguity in the 
expression “quasi-transcendental”. Does the expression 
mean that such interests are transcendental in the sense 
of being somehow inherent in all human consciousness? 
If so, there seems to be only a “philosophical” basis for 
them. If they are transcendental in the sense of being 
detectable as a generalization from past societies, there 
is no reason to suppose that they will persist in different 
societies in the future, any more than will, say, class 
struggle. However, Ray (2004) argues that the turn 
towards ideal speech acts fails to solve this ambiguity, 
and insists on calling the ideal speech act a “quasi-
transcendental” scheme too.  
In more familiar terms, there is a general and a specific 
level at which the model might operate. At the very 
general level,  Habermas runs the risk of suggesting that 
all human speech in any society and any context could 
be seen as equally inherently emancipatory. This makes 
it difficult to comment on specific political situations, to 
distinguish between speech at a strike meeting and 
speech at a garden centre, rather as with Freire (below), 
at least without using some external standard of 
emancipatory potential. At the specific level, it is clear 
that all sorts of additional elements affect actual speech 
acts, not just the classic discussion of validity claims, and 




these range from the importance of emotions to the 
effects of cultural constraints which might have the 
effect, say, of excluding women (Dews 1987).  The actual 
theory is too simple and abstract to explain these 
constraints properly. Fraser (1989) makes the same 
point, and says the argument needs to be 
complemented with some detailed examination of 
actual dialogues to see how power is exercised.  Lyotard 
is perhaps the most trenchant critic, arguing that real 
power differentials in actual dialogues will convert the 
emancipatory potential of the ideal speech act into a 
form of totalitarianism, a constant demand for 
justification from underlings (see Dews 1987 on the 
Habermas - Lyotard debate). 
It is clear that this criticism could apply equally to any 
approach which stresses a general model of action 
without specifying the concrete conditions likely to 
affect its development in practice.  In the abstract, such 
approaches are doubtless intended to be emancipatory, 
but much will depend on the intentions of those in 
power in practice. Thus well-known models of the 
“reflective practitioner” could easily become in practice 
techniques which stress the need for constant internal 
discipline to improve performance and “quality” without 
external supervision (Hobbs 2007), a kind of Japanese 
“quality circle” for academic life. “Lifelong learning” 
could become the equivalent for students, making 
people endlessly responsible for their own upskilling and 
blaming them personally if they become unemployed.  
Habermas clearly notices the possibilities, and intends 
that the ideal speech act should remain “ideal” in one of 
the more usual senses of the word as well (that is as 
desirable in an ideal world).  We should use it 
“counterfactually”, that is as a critical model to gauge 
the emancipatory potential of actual dialogues of the 
kind we are likely to encounter in universities.  How 
close is the resemblance between the ideal act, where 
legitimacy can be challenged by any participant, to the 
routine kinds of consultation with management that we 
mentioned earlier, for example?  For that matter, how 
close is the ideal speech act to the sort of discussion that 
goes on in lectures and seminars? Habermas indicates 
that rather more common types of communication are 
“strategic” (designed to persuade us to adopt policies 
that suit others) or “distorted” (pretending specific 
interests are universal ones, found, for example, when 
the State speaks for “the nation”, or a boss speaks for an 
organization) – see Habermas (1976). 
There are additional complications. The general theory 
insists that all normal members of a community are 
competent speakers, made equally able by the very 
nature of language to engage in dialogue. However, 
there may be circumstances where the participants are 
rightfully thought to be not fully competent – teaching 
children might be one example. In this case, a 
benevolent kind of strategic communication might be 
needed, instead of the full ideal speech act, at least until 
the children have learned enough to participate fully. 
There are clear problems in judging when full 
competence is to be granted, of course. Who should 
decide?  How could we tell if a restriction is benevolent, 
and not just a way of refusing to address challenges to 
validity? It is tempting to conclude with Ray that 
Habermas has actually got it all upside down. It is not 
that ideal speech acts will create a new democratic form 
of public sphere, but rather than a democratic 
community is needed before the ideal speech act can be 
developed. 
Freire’s occasional incorporation into management 
discourse is even more curious, since his educational 
practice is clearly connected to a radical political project 
to emancipate the oppressed in Brazil – his most famous 
book, after all, refers to the oppressed in the title! 
(Freire 1972).  The oppressed are to be liberated and 
empowered by being able to take on and challenge the 
dominant discourses of local and national elites.  Such 
liberation and empowerment is to occur first by making 
the oppressed literate and able to think and read about 
terms that they commonly encounter in their everyday 
lives, such as “rent”.  They are then supposed to think 
and read about alternatives.  Whereas the notion of rent 
is classically defended as some kind of natural and 




traditional payment to a benevolent owner of the land, 
for example, Freire would want to encourage the 
oppressed to read, say, Marx’s account of rent.  For 
Marx, there is nothing natural and traditional about 
modern forms of rent at all, of course, and the 
traditional name for the payment is just used to disguise 
and legitimise the central process of the extraction of 
surplus value from labour, in this particular case from 
agricultural labour.  The oppressed are to follow these 
alternative and radical accounts after a process of 
dialogue that involves identifying and problematising 
their existing concepts: oppressed people identify rents 
as an important issue in their lives, radical educators 
skilfully show the limits of existing conceptions of rent 
and the superiority of radical conceptions.  There are 
hints of a phenomenological model in such dialogues, 
where the parties thematise elements that the other has 
left in an unexamined horizon. Freire’s dialogue 
therefore involves the inevitable development of a 
radical political consciousness, one that will lead to 
liberating practice, as illusions and false consciousness 
are stripped away -- “conscientisation”.   
This conception of liberation probably grants too much 
weight to the role of ideas or “consciousness” in 
practices of domination, however, and many 
commentators have noted with regret the subsequent 
depoliticisation of Freire’s concept of dialogue (for 
example Kane 2005). Freire might have only himself to 
blame, however, in developing such an idealist 
conception. In the piece on “conscientisation” in Dale et 
al. (1976), Freire develops a broad notion of oppression, 
not just material oppression in the sense of being 
emiserated, imprisoned or economically exploited.  In 
effect, Freire suggests that anyone who fails to realise 
that social reality is socially constructed is oppressed. 
The problem with this very general notion is that nearly 
everyone, therefore, is oppressed, not just political 
activists but amateur gardeners as well. Similarly, any 
sort of action designed to overcome the slightest 
constraint could be seen as “praxis”. This idea became 
popular among some radical educators in the 1970s, 
such as Fay (1975): comfortable academics “struggled” 
to liberate themselves from the oppression of an 
inconvenient timetable, and saw themselves as part of 
the same struggle as the war in Vietnam (Harris 1992). 
Dominant groups will always be able to bend general 
concepts to their specific ends, and so it should not 
surprise us to find even senior executives claiming they 
are engaged in “struggle” -- perhaps the best example is 
the literature on entrepreneurship which often 
emphasises the heroic struggles of innovators to 
overcome inertia and early rejection, in order to fulfil 
their dream (see Beard 1982 on Walt Disney). 
Dialogue and pedagogy  
Universities above all institutions are supposed to 
enshrine critical debate and discussion.  Of course, until 
recently, these discussions were confined to heavily 
selected members, or potential members, of an elite. 
Nevertheless, even in modern universities it is possible 
to find echoes of the old values implying communities of 
scholars, governing themselves collegially, with an 
agreed purpose of pursuing the best arguments 
regardless of their immediate use or political 
convenience.  Even Habermas (1971) saw some value in 
this inherently democratic and emancipatory tradition in 
German universities of the 1970s, although he warned 
that, as the outcomes of student revolts of the period 
demonstrated, real coercive State powers were also at 
play. We now realize the considerable effects of the 
financial and regulatory powers the State possesses as 
well. 
Much of the “new pedagogy” intended for new lecturers 
in new universities derives from UKOU practice in the 
1970s. It shows its origins in placing most of the 
emphasis for stimulating interaction on academics 
themselves, often curiously combined with advocating 
the use of pre-specified and apparently closed list of 
objectives or learning outcomes. (A parallel 
development is noticeable in the modern idea of a 
textbook, where various pedagogical devices, including 
“activities”, “exercises”, or “in-text questions” are used 
to pre-structure the reader’s interactions with the text, 




just like an OU course ‘unit’). Well-known advice offers 
ways to make seminars more “interesting” or 
“interactive”, for example, often by using stimulating 
material such as problems to solve, questions to answer, 
activities to pursue, or other variants of “learning 
through discussion” (Northedge 1993).  Study skills 
advice is also available, ranging from recommending 
more “active” ways to take notes, to suggesting 
techniques to develop academic literacy (see Arksey and 
Harris 2007). The combinations of “active learning” and 
study skills could be seen as a parallel to the human 
relations school of management, however (Harris 1994).  
Any “free” discussion can still function rather like the 
dialogue in management discourse—to develop 
motivation and commitment for the task in hand not to 
challenge it.   
The major problem affecting those who wish to 
encourage open-ended discussion in universities is the 
assessment system, however. The growth of the amount 
and type of assessment indicates the importance of 
credentialism as a major public role for the university, 
but pervasive assessment distorts communication: 
strategic reason dominates, to revert to Habermasian 
terms. Student “instrumentalism”, a strategic approach 
to academic life which makes gaining good grades the 
centre of effort, has been researched since Becker et 
al.’s classic (1995) study noticed that students took a 
significantly instrumental stance towards their studies, 
practising the “selective neglect” of discussion which 
was not assessed, the strategic choice of course likely to 
provide better grades, the tactical analysis of tutor 
preferences, and an overall collective effort to manage 
educational requirements in a way that provides the 
most efficient return for the effort expended, a semi-
deviant underdogs’ counterpart to rational 
management.  A number of recent studies (for example 
Norton et al. 2001, Sheard et al. 2003) have shown 
similar stances by modern students, who have less time, 
probably fewer cultural resources, and rather more 
focused vocational interests in grades and certification 
than did the classic students of elite universities.  A 
punishing assessment schedule encourages behaviour 
that is used to reduce the risk of discussion and debate 
and that delivers what is required with minimum effort 
or risk.  We find a range of awareness of effective 
techniques to “play the game”, though, from risky and 
naive types of plagiarism, to simulated discussion and 
open-ended inquiry in what Entwistle (2000) calls a 
“technified deep approach”.   
It is also reasonable to assume that increased attention 
to institutional performance, in the form of student 
retention rates and distributions of grades, will 
exacerbate the tendency for university tutors to teach to 
the test. Miller and Parlett, in Hammersley and Woods 
(1976), noticed that tutors varied in the “cues” they 
would offer to students facing a traditional unseen 
examination in an elite university. The role of “revision 
sessions” or “supervision” in the modern university 
would be a fascinating area to research. 
We might still find non-strategic values officially 
embodied in course design documents and marking 
criteria, which stress the importance of “critical 
thinking” and independent argument.  It is still common 
to find passionate defences of conventional seminars 
too, usually directed against enthusiasts for electronic 
teaching, in the name of open-ended discussion and 
debate.  We have some rather unsystematic case studies 
that give quite an interesting picture of actual seminars 
by contrast.  Casey et al. (2002), for example, find that 
students commonly experience their seminars as 
stressful and as potentially embarrassing, and wish to 
avoid any process of subjecting their views to discussion 
and debate, while Reay (2002) reports that having to 
discuss matters in seminars is a major source of anxiety 
for those non-traditional students thinking of applying 
to university. 
The most systematically critical discussion of academic 
discourse is found in Bourdieu’s work, however. 
Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus” refers to an 
unconscious system of categories and distinctions that is 
used to make judgements about the world: in fact, the 
system generates judgments when novel cases are 




encountered as well, but the unconscious nature of the 
system means that these appear as ‘second nature’, 
simply obvious to the individuals concerned.  This notion 
does a great deal of work in Bourdieu’s diverse writings, 
but in particular it offers a way to systematize the 
empirical data gathered in the substantial work on taste 
(Bourdieu 1984). In this study, two underlying 
“aesthetics” are identified: the “popular aesthetic” 
which values emotional engagement, immediacy, direct 
involvement and participation, and content, and the 
contrasting “high aesthetic”, which values emotional 
coolness and disengagement, an intellectual rather than 
an emotional engagement, and an emphasis on form 
rather than content.  Whereas the popular aesthetic 
takes visible form in the passionate support of football 
fans for their team, for example, the high aesthetic is 
apparent in intellectual discussions of the relative merits 
of particular film directors. 
There are two significant implications arising from the 
identification of these aesthetics.  The first one is that 
they are both grounded in social ways of life: they are 
“class cultures”.  Cultural background provides an 
unconscious socialization, which takes place not just 
through words and conscious experiences, but through 
various forms of social practices, sometimes involving 
notions of social distance, which are deeply held, 
sometimes even manifested in bodily behaviour 
(Bourdieu 2000). The second implication is that these 
aesthetic and cultural systems are deeply implicated in 
forms of social solidarity and exclusion, ongoing cultural 
class struggle.  It is clear that the high aesthetic is 
formulated deliberately to oppose the popular one, to 
exclude those who hold the popular one, and to claim a 
cultural superiority.  It is also clear that intellectual 
engagement and an interest in form require a particular 
stock of “cultural capital”.  Those who deploy the high 
aesthetic as second nature have been born to it; have 
experienced a particular family culture that enables the 
effortless reproduction of stock-in-trade distinctions and 
categories. 
The system of unconsciously held aesthetics enables a 
powerful critique of academic culture and educational 
practice as well.  Bourdieu’s work here includes 
sociological criticisms of academic knowledge and 
practices in elite French educational institutions.  In one 
example, Bourdieu (1988) offers a study of the actual 
assessment practices of elite French schoolteachers, 
which discloses that beneath the apparently explicit and 
rational procedures there lies an unconscious structure 
of judgment.  This structure is closely related to the high 
aesthetic.  French schoolteachers use unconscious 
judgments to assess the worth of student work, and 
often refer to matters of taste as well as to technical 
merits.  They also rely on other social judgments, which 
produce a “whole collection of disparate criteria, never 
clarified, hierarchized or systematized... ‘handwriting’, 
‘appearance’, ‘style’, ‘general culture’, ‘”external” 
criteria’ such as accent, elocution and diction”, and 
“finally and above all the bodily ‘hexis’” which includes 
“manners and behaviour, which are often designated, 
very directly, in the remarks” (Bourdieu 1988: 200). 
These bodily social judgements are likely to thrive 
especially in face to face teaching, of course. 
Bourdieu and Passeron, in Bourdieu et al. (1994), 
critically examine practices of teaching and assessment 
in elite French universities.  They note that the 
traditional teaching pattern reproduces the same sort of 
unconscious structure of judgment and taste, and this 
determines academic style.  Classically, the style is more 
to do with taste rather than technical content.  This style 
is “creolized” in student work, especially in the 
traditional essay.   
Both sets of participants recognise that technical 
misunderstandings are chronically likely, but both 
students and lecturers see such misunderstandings as 
inevitable, and as socially important.  Lecturers are keen 
to demonstrate their mastery of suitable academic 
discourse, and justify their role in a variety of ways, from 
claiming that using more technical discourse would be 
damaging to their careers, to insisting that the proper 
role of academic discourse is to inspire rather than to 




directly inform.  Students for their part are content to 
find the whole exercise mystifying, although they can 
clearly appreciate its high status and the benefits that 
might be passed on.  They express frequent criticisms of 
academic discourse, but in a rather tolerant and fond 
way, much as they might rebuke a parent for being out 
of touch.  Students can also appreciate the advantages 
of agreeing to be treated as an ideal student rather than 
as an actual person, and are aware that they will not be 
personally interrogated.  They know that lecturers will 
actively interpret their impoverished efforts to 
reproduce academic discourse as understandable, when 
their work comes to be assessed. 
Unconstrained dialogues are extremely unlikely to 
develop in universities, therefore, even in elite 
universities, with traditional assessment.  In most cases, 
dialogue will represent only the professional ideology of 
the university, that which goes on “officially” between 
ideal lecturers and ideal students.  None of the 
participants has a real material interest in emancipation. 
Instead, they will be content with reproducing 
considerable misunderstanding and social constraint, all 
the time seeing that their interests lie in preserving the 
ideal and disguising the reality. This adherence to an 
idealized version of events makes research in 
universities difficult too, Bourdieu and Passeron note, 
and they advocate a critical stance towards any data 
arising, especially from interviews. 
The unconscious nature of these cultural and academic 
preferences means that reforming them will be almost 
impossible, particularly without substantial change in 
the social composition and functioning of the university.  
Bourdieu’s and Passeron’s students sometimes 
expressed a wish to change traditional patterns of 
teaching into what looked like more democratic and 
participatory forms – round table discussions instead of 
formal lectures, for example – but these will only make 
the traditional notion of academic discourse more 
“comfortable”.  Until unconscious cultural preferences, 
and the real material advantages accruing to credentials, 
change, lecturers will still dominate the exchanges, since 
they are the only ones who can effortlessly expound 
academic discourse, and possess the power to translate 
ordinary language back into academic terms. 
Bourdieu and Passeron end their analysis with a hint of 
what might be done in some utopian university that 
manages to escape the social structure. The idea would 
be to develop a much more rational and technical form 
of communication, with the cultural judgments stripped 
out. Many pedagogues have had similar ideas, at least 
since Bentham in his proposal for a school. There, 
teaching could proceed on utilitarian principles, with 
pupils guided through a series of steps with a system of 
rewards and punishments (not corporal punishment 
though) until they internalised the principles for 
themselves. However, academic subjects would also 
have to be drastically simplified and rationalised, with 
their inner logic exposed clearly. A “rational 
nomenclature” was needed to both present to view the 
contents of a branch of knowledge (its “ordinary” 
purpose) and reveal the relations between different 
branches of knowledge (the “systematic” purpose). 
“Conceptions” should be “as clear, correct, and 
complete as by and in the compass of a single 
denomination can be afforded” (Bentham 1983: 142), 
and the relations between these unambiguous 
conceptions should be depicted. Such clarity and 
consistency would enable what these days would be 
termed a “closure principle”: 
...the parts...[of a subject]...must exhaust 
the contents of the whole...the information, 
contained in a work which is composed of 
them [i.e. the conceptions], can be 
complete...[If not]...the form in which [a 
work] presents itself will be no other than 
that of a confused heap of unconnected 
fragments - each of them, in respect of form 
and quantity, boundless and indeterminate. 
(Bentham 1983: 218). 
I have argued (Harris 1987) that the same general 
principles surfaced again in the UK Open University in 
the 1970s with its reliance on “educational technology” 
to teach the unqualified, involving clear and effective 
communication, stripped of “irrelevant scholastic 




displays” (Lewis 1971).  One research project attempted 
to lay bare the very structures of academic knowledge, 
conceived in terms of Russell’s logic (hints of the project 
persist in Laurillard’s (1993) better-known notion of 
“conversational learning”). Harris (1987) suggests that 
the project failed, partly because academics were able 
to argue that academic discourse contains so many non-
logical procedures and judgements, such as 
“justifications” and other essentially rhetorical forms. 
The attempt to code them into logical forms revealed 
itself as arbitrary: they could not all be grasped as 
unclear logic or dismissed as irrelevant display.  Such 
procedures and forms might be understood as centrally 
valuable elements, of course, but Bourdieu’s critique of 
their social and political role remains. 
Concluding thoughts 
In the modern university, dialogue seems highly likely to 
be confined to the first and third types that we have 
been discussing.  Neither managerialism nor 
credentialism are going to go away because they are 
strongly supported by the State.  In these circumstances, 
critics like Cohen (2004) have suggested that universities 
can no longer be seen as the natural home of open-
ended discussion.  Trying to avoid reliance on the State 
is one limited option, probably available only to elite 
universities. Cohen has recommended the development 
of “community universities” like some found in 
Scandinavia.  My own preferences, for what they are 
worth, lie in the direction of open-ended electronic 
communication of the kind which is possible, if not too 
frequent, on the Web. The potential has been much 
discussed, although often in the form of official, 
university-mediated electronic communication (as 
guides to a huge literature see Slater 2005, or the JISC 
Innovation Forum 2008). I am advocating instead the 
development of non-official sites. 
The Web is, of course, clearly contradictory, initially 
driven by commerce and the military (and now by the 
sex industry especially), but also with a curious potential 
for relatively unconstrained participation, established 
from the beginning. A kind of electronic democratization 
becomes possible. Participation is limited, of course,  to 
those who possess a computer, an online connection, 
and the ability to speak or write English.  Given those 
still important constraints, it is possible for many more 
users to read, critique, discuss and compare any of the 
vast materials available, without any constraints of 
costs, and no need for organised course programming 
and timetabling, bureaucratic regulation, or, above all, 
assessment.  It is equally possible to publish views of 
one’s own and so have them read, critiqued and 
discussed (assuming a little technical knowledge about 
how search engines operate). It has been argued that 
substantial liberation from social constraint, especially 
those indexed by bodily characteristics like age, skin 
colour or gender is also available (Haraway 2003). 
 I myself have had stimulating open ended discussions 
with a wide range of people who have emailed me to 
discuss material on my website, or whom I have 
emailed. I do not assess them, and nor do they evaluate 
me.  I am not provided with details about their status or 
power. Neither party has given any sign of wishing to 
dominate the agenda. My correspondents include 
famous academics, who are more accessible than they 
have ever been, and students in foreign countries. Of 
course, it is still entirely in the hands of the participants 
whether they wish to make the exchanges cumulative, 
or use their access merely to “play the game”.  
Electronic teaching and discussion is still far from a 
complete correspondence to the ideal speech act, but 
increasingly I turn to it for the closest available 
alternative. Such an alternative can never be 
mainstream, since it does not credentialise, but it offers 
a valuable counterfactual alternative to official 
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